351/527 papers continuizable (66%) · 174 carry a hardness result · new results: 20/26 mirrors attempted (76%) · complexity drops: 6/15 settled hardness mirrors (+2 encoding-dependent)
reset view351/527 papers continuizable (66%) · 174 carry a hardness result · new results: 20/26 mirrors attempted (76%) · complexity drops: 6/15 settled hardness mirrors (+2 encoding-dependent)
| paper | authors | area | venue | mirror | hardness | Δ complexity | outputs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Locally Fair Partitioning | Pankaj K. Agarwal, Shao-Heng Ko, Kamesh Munagala, Erin Taylor | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Maximizing Nash Social Welfare in 2-Value Instances | Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Martin Hoefer, Kurt Mehlhorn, Marco Schmalhofer, Golnoosh Shahkarami, Giovanna Varricchio, Quentin Vermande, Ernest van Wijland | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Truth-Tracking via Approval Voting: Size Matters | Tahar Allouche, Jérôme Lang, Florian Yger | Voting · Rationalization | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Dimensionality and Coordination in Voting: The Distortion of STV | Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair and Truthful Giveaway Lotteries | Tal Arbiv, Yonatan Aumann | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Universal and Tight Online Algorithms for Generalized-Mean Welfare | Siddharth Barman, Arindam Khan, Arnab Maiti | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Truthful and Fair Mechanisms for Matroid-Rank Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Truthful Cake Sharing | Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents | Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Sequential Blocked Matching | Nicholas Bishop, Hau Chan, Debmalya Mandal, Long Tran-Thanh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Combating Collusion Rings Is Hard but Possible | Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, André Nichterlein | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Theory of and Experiments on Minimally Invasive Stability Preservation in Changing Two-Sided Matching Markets | Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| A Calculus for Computing Structured Justifications for Election Outcomes | Arthur Boixel, Ulle Endriss, Ronald de Haan | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Single-Agent Dynamics in Additively Separable Hedonic Games | Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Leo Tappe | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| On Improving Resource Allocations by Sharing | Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Junjie Luo, Rolf Niedermeier, Florian Sachse | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegations | Markus Brill, Théo Delemazure, Anne-Marie George, Martin Lackner, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting | Markus Brill, Jonas Israel, Evi Micha, Jannik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| The Metric Distortion of Multiwinner Voting | Ioannis Caragiannis, Nisarg Shah, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| A Little Charity Guarantees Fair Connected Graph Partitioning | Ioannis Caragiannis, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees | Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, Nicos Protopapas | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules | Ioannis Caragiannis, Karl Fehrs | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited | Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Pizza Sharing Is PPA-Hard | Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources | Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation | Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul Goldberg | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| The Price of Justified Representation | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| The Complexity of Subelection Isomorphism Problems | Piotr Faliszewski, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Two-Price Equilibrium | Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Hedonic Diversity Games: A Complexity Picture with More than Two Colors | Robert Ganian, Thekla Hamm, Dušan Knop, Šimon Schierreich, Ondřej Suchý | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences | Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete Information | Aviram Imber, Jonas Israel, Markus Brill, Benny Kimelfeld | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Reforming an Envy-Free Matching | Takehiro Ito, Yuni Iwamasa, Naonori Kakimura, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Yusuke Kobayashi, Yuta Nozaki, Yoshio Okamoto, Kenta Ozeki | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| The Complexity of Proportionality Degree in Committee Elections | Łukasz Janeczko, Piotr Faliszewski | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Worst-Case Voting When the Stakes Are High | Anson Kahng, Gregory Kehne | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| The Semi-random Likelihood of Doctrinal Paradoxes | Ao Liu, Lirong Xia | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Online Elicitation of Necessarily Optimal Matchings | Jannik Peters | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Improved Maximin Guarantees for Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Fair Allocation Problem | Masoud Seddighin, Saeed Seddighin | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportional Public Decisions | Piotr Skowron, Adrian Górecki | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Iterative Calculus of Voting under Plurality | Fabricio Vasselai | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Private Rank Aggregation in Central and Local Models | Daniel Alabi, Badih Ghazi, Ravi Kumar, Pasin Manurangsi | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Hedonic Games with Fixed-Size Coalitions | Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints | Jiehua Chen, Martin Lackner, Jan Maly | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| How Many Representatives Do We Need? The Optimal Size of a Congress Voting on Binary Issues | Manon Revel, Tao Lin, Daniel Halpern | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Finding Fair Allocations under Budget Constraints | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Now We’re Talking: Better Deliberation Groups through Submodular Optimization | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Causes of Stability in Dynamic Coalition Formation | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Properties of Position Matrices and Their Elections | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Rank Aggregation Using Scoring Rules | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Multiwinner Voting with Possibly Unavailable Candidates | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Fair Division with Prioritized Agents | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Topological Distance Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions? not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Complexity of Probabilistic Inference in Random Dichotomous Hedonic Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAAI 2023 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Participatory Budgeting Designs for the Real World | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| PAC Learning and Stabilizing Hedonic Games: Towards a Unifying Approach. | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Representation with Incomplete Votes | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Optimizing Multiple Simultaneous Objectives for Voting and Facility Location | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Class Fairness in Online Matching | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| How to Cut a Discrete Cake Fairly | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Voting with Preference Intensities | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximations for Indivisible Concave Allocations with Applications to | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Strategic Facility Location with Clients That Minimize Total Waiting Time not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Proportional Decisions in Perpetual Voting | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Multiagent MST Cover: Pleasing All Optimally via a Simple Voting Rule | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Partitioning Friends Fairly | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Differentially Private Condorcet Voting | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Differentially Private Fair Division | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fast and Interpretable Dynamics for Fisher Markets | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Ballot Length in Instant Runoff Voting | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Multi-Stage Facility Location Problems with Transient Agents | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Bayesian Optimization-Based Combinatorial Assignment* | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Semi-random Impossibilities of Condorcet Criterion | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Tournament Fixing Parameterized by Feedback Vertex Set Number Is FPT | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Truthful Mechanisms for Steiner Tree Problems not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Collusion-Proof and Sybil-Proof Reward Mechanisms for Query Incentive not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Local Justice and Machine Learning: Modeling and Inferring not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| An Efficient Algorithm for Fair Multi-Agent Multi-Armed Bandit with Low Regret not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Multi-Unit Auctions for Allocating Chance-Constrained Resources | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Fairness in Contextual Resource Allocation Systems: | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Maximizing the Probability of Fixation in the Positional Voter Model not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Exploring Tradeoffs in Automated School Redistricting: not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Envy-Free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Nearly Equitable Allocations beyond Additivity and Monotonicity | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Enhancing the Efficiency of Altruism and Taxes not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Completing Priceable Committees: | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Stability in Online Coalition Formation | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Low-Distortion Clustering with Ordinal and Limited Cardinal Information | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Making | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| How to Make Knockout Tournaments More Popular? | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| 1/2 - Approximate MMS Allocation for Separable Piecewise Linear Concave | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives under the Lens of Pairwise Distortion | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Implications of Distance over Redistricting Maps: Central and Outlier Maps⇤ | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare* | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Manipulation-Robust Selection of Citizens’ Assemblies | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Aggregation | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Maxileximin Envy Allocations and Connected Goods | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Worst-Case VCG Redistribution Mechanism Design Based on the Lottery Ticket | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| An Exercise in Tournament Design: When Some Matches Must Be Scheduled | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Regret Analysis of Repeated Delegated Choice not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Cost Minimization for Equilibrium Transition not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Reachability of Fair Allocations via Sequential Exchanges | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Spatial Voting with Incomplete Voter Information | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Maximizing Nash Social Welfare under Two-Sided Preferences | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Proportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Towards Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Envy-Freeable Allocations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Machine Learning-Powered Combinatorial Clock Auction | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods or Chores with Entitlements | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| The Moderating Effect of Instant Runoff Voting | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Unravelling Expressive Delegations: Complexity and Normative Analysis | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Learning Coalition Structures with Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Greedy-Based Online Fair Allocation with Adversarial Input: | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Eliciting Honest Information from Authors Using Sequential Review* | Voting · Rationalization | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Allocation of Items in Multiple Regions | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Altruism in Facility Location Problems | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| ‘Why Didn’t You Allocate This Task to Them?’ | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximation Algorithms for Preference Aggregation Using CP-Nets | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Axiomatic Aggregations of Abductive Explanations not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Eliciting Kemeny Rankings | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Approximating the Shapley Value without Marginal Contributions | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Stable Matchings in Practice: A Constraint Programming Approach | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Towards a More Burkean Approach to Computational Social Choice | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Mixed Fair Division: A Survey | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Epistemic EFX Allocations Exist for Monotone Valuations | Hannaneh Akrami, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Achieving Maximin Share and EFX/EF1 Guarantees Simultaneously | Hannaneh Akrami, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control | Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Łukasz Janeczko, Grzegorz Lisowski, Georgios Papasotiropoulos | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| EF2X Exists for Four Agents | Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Fair Division via the Cake-Cutting Share | Yannan Bai, Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen, Ian Zhang | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Increasing Revenue in Efficient Combinatorial Auctions by Learning to Generate Artificial Competition not comsoc | Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Proportional Representation in Practice: Quantifying Proportionality in Ordinal Elections | Tuva Bardal, Markus Brill, David McCune, Jannik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Fair Division with Market Values | Siddharth Barman, Soroush Ebadian, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| The Distortion of Public-Spirited Participatory Budgeting | Mark Bedaywi, Bailey Flanigan, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders not comsoc | Xiaohui Bei, Pinyan Lu, Zhiqi Wang, Tao Xiao, Xiang Yan | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Nearly Tight Bounds on Approximate Equilibria in Spatial Competition on the Line | Umang Bhaskar, Soumyajit Pyne | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice | Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Welfare-Optimal Serial Dictatorships Have Polynomial Query Complexity | Ioannis Caragiannis, Kurt Mehlhorn, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions | Hau Chan, Jianan Lin, Zining Qin, Chenhao Wang | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Adaptive Manipulation for Coalitions in Knockout Tournaments | Juhi Chaudhary, Hendrik Molter, Meirav Zehavi | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Online Learning of Coalition Structures by Selfish Agents | Saar Cohen, Noa Agmon | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Constrained Fair and Efficient Allocations | Benjamin Cookson, Soroush Ebadian, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Temporal Fair Division | Benjamin Cookson, Soroush Ebadian, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria not comsoc | Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith, Stavros D. Ioannidis | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Balanced and Fair Partitioning of Friends | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Stavros D. Ioannidis, Dušan Knop, Šimon Schierreich | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Eliminating Majority Illusion Is Easy | Jack Dippel, Max Dupré la Tour, April Niu, Sanjukta Roy, Adrian Vetta | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Private Blotto: Viewpoint Competition with Polarized Agents not comsoc | Kate Donahue, Jon Kleinberg | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Every Bit Helps: Achieving the Optimal Distortion with a Few Queries | Soroush Ebadian, Nisarg Shah | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting | Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Jannik Peters, Nicholas Teh | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Distances Between Top-Truncated Elections of Different Sizes | Piotr Faliszewski, Jitka Mertlová, Pierre Nunn, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Rationalization | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Individually Stable Dynamics in Coalition Formation over Graphs | Angelo Fanelli, Laurent Gourvès, Ayumi Igarashi, Luca Moscardelli | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation | Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Exact Algorithms and Lower Bounds for Forming Coalitions of Constrained Maximum Size | Foivos Fioravantes, Harmender Gahlawat, Nikolaos Melissinos | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Fair Division with Social Impact | Michele Flammini, Gianluigi Greco, Giovanna Varricchio | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| On the Distortion of Committee Election with 1-Euclidean Preferences and Few Distance Queries | Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourvès, Panagiotis Patsilinakos | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Forecasting Competitions with Correlated Events | Rafael Frongillo, Manuel Lladser, Anish Thilagar, Bo Waggoner | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Improved Maximin Share Approximations for Chores by Bin Packing | Jugal Garg, Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| (Almost Full) EFX for Three (and More) Types of Agents | Pratik Ghosal, Vishwa Prakash HV, Prajakta Nimbhorkar, Nithin Varma | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Federated Assemblies | Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization | Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Learning to Manipulate Under Limited Information | Wesley H. Holliday, Alexander Kristoffersen, Eric Pacuit | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Strategyproof Matching of Roommates and Rooms | Hadi Hosseini, Shivika Narang, Sanjukta Roy | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Value Distributions not comsoc | Da Huo, Zhenzhe Zheng, Fan Wu | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job | Christopher Jerrett, Yue Han, Elliot Anshelevich | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting | Alexander Kozachinskiy, Alexander Shen, Tomasz Steifer | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| The (Exact) Price of Cardinality for Indivisible Goods: A Parametric Perspective | Alexander Lam, Bo Li, Ankang Sun | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Sample Complexity of Linear Regression Models for Opinion Formation in Networks not comsoc | Haolin Liu, Rajmohan Rajaraman, Ravi Sundaram, Anil Kumar Vullikanti, Omer Wasim, Haifeng Xu | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Decentralized Convergence to Equilibrium Prices in Trading Networks not comsoc | Edwin Lock, Benjamin Patrick Evans, Eleonora Kreacic, Sujay Bhatt, Alec Koppel, Sumitra Ganesh, Paul W. Goldberg | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Hedging and Approximate Truthfulness in Traditional Forecasting Competitions not comsoc | Mary Monroe, Anish Thilagar, Melody Hsu, Rafael Frongillo | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| On the Power of Strategic Corpus Enrichment in Content Creation Games not comsoc | Haya Nachimovsky, Moshe Tennenholtz | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| On the Convergence of Tâtonnement for Linear Fisher Markets | Tianlong Nan, Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Understanding EFX Allocations: Counting and Variants | Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Fair and Efficient Completion of Indivisible Goods | Vishwa Prakash HV, Ayumi Igarashi, Rohit Vaish | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Multi-Apartment Rent Division | Ariel D. Procaccia, Benjamin Schiffer, Shirley Zhang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Constant-Factor Distortion Mechanisms for k-Committee Election | Haripriya Pulyassary, Chaitanya Swamy | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Improved Regret Bounds for Online Fair Division with Bandit Learning | Benjamin Schiffer, Shirley Zhang | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Facility Location Games with Optional Preferences: A Revisit | Xingchen Sha, Shuyu Bao, Hau Chan, Vincent Chau, Ken C. K. Fong, Minming Li | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Voter Priming Campaigns: Strategies, Equilibria, and Algorithms | Jonathan Shaki, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Achieving Balanced Representation in School Choice with Diversity Goals | Zhaohong Sun, Makoto Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Replicating Electoral Success | Kiran Tomlinson, Tanvi Namjoshi, Johan Ugander, Jon Kleinberg | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Paid with Models: Optimal Contract Design for Collaborative Machine Learning not comsoc | Bingchen Wang, Zhaoxuan Wu, Fusheng Liu, Bryan Kian Hsiang Low | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Deviate or Not: Learning Coalition Structures with Multiple-bit Observations in Games | Yixuan Even Xu, Zhe Feng, Fei Fang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| An Extension-Based Argument-Ranking Semantics: Social Rankings in Abstract Argumentation not comsoc | Lars Bengel, Giovanni Buraglio, Jan Maly, Kenneth Skiba | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Fast Computing of Dung Semantics in Acyclic Probabilistic Argumentation Frameworks not comsoc | Stefano Bistarelli, Victor David, Pierre Monnin, Francesco Santini, Carlo Taticchi | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Dung’s Argumentation Framework: Unveiling the Expressive Power with Inconsistent Databases not comsoc | Yasir Mahmood, Markus Hecher, Axel-Cyrille Ngonga Ngomo | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportionally Fair Matching via Randomized Rounding | Sharmila Duppala, Nathaniel Grammel, Juan Luque, Calum MacRury, Aravind Srinivasan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| DiffIM: Differentiable Influence Minimization with Surrogate Modeling and Continuous Relaxation not comsoc | Junghun Lee, Hyunju Kim, Fanchen Bu, Jihoon Ko, Kijung Shin | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Decentralized and Uncoordinated Learning of Stable Matchings: A Game-Theoretic Approach | S. Rasoul Etesami, R. Srikant | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| A Multiagent Path Search Algorithm for Large-Scale Coalition Structure Generation | Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Are Key-Phrases All That Reviewers Care About? A Comprehensive Benchmarking of Reviewer Matchmaking Systems not comsoc | Sourish Dasgupta, Harsh Sharma, Devansh Patel, Prarthee Desai, Anil K. Roy | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Joint Scoring Rules: Competition Between Agents Avoids Performative Prediction not comsoc | Rubi Hudson | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Contextual Stochastic Optimization for School Desegregation Policymaking not comsoc | Hongzhao Guan, Nabeel Gillani, Tyler Simko, Jasmine Mangat, Pascal Van Hentenryck | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| A Vision for Reinventing Credible Elections with Artificial Intelligence not comsoc | Biplav Srivastava | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Incentives for Early Arrival | Dengji Zhao | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Multivariate Algorithmics for Eliminating Envy by Donating Goods | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Proportional Representation in Matching Markets: Selecting Multiple Matchings under Dichotomous Preferences | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Little House (Seat) on the Prairie: Compactness, Gerrymandering, and Population Distribution | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | – | – | triple | ||
| Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | AAMAS 2022 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated Preferences | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Simulating Multiwinner Voting Rules in Judgment Aggregation | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Pareto Optimal and Popular House Allocation with Lower and Upper Quotas | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Three-Dimensional Popular Matching with Cyclic Preferences | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple Games | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| How to Fairly Allocate Easy and Difficult Chores | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Facility Location With Approval Preferences: Strategyproofness and Fairness | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAMAS 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments: Equilibria and Algorithms | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Fair and Truthful Mechanism with Limited Subsidy | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Optimal Matchings with One-Sided Preferences: Fixed and Cost-Based Quotas | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| How Hard is Safe Bribery? | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Equilibria in Schelling Games: Computational Hardness and Robustness | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Coalition Formation Games and Social Ranking Solutions | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| A Graph-Based Algorithm for the Automated Justification of Collective Decisions | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| How Hard is Bribery in Elections with Randomly Selected Voters | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Position-Based Matching with Multi-Modal Preferences | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Strategy-Proof House Allocation with Existing Tenants over Social Networks | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Tracking Truth by Weighting Proxies in Liquid Democracy | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Social Choice Around the Block: On the Computational Social Choice of Blockchain | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2022 | – | – | triple | ||
| Ask and You Shall be Served: Representing & Solving Multi-agent Optimization Problems with Service Requesters and Providers not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Fair Allocation of Two Types of Chores | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Fairly Dividing Mixtures of Goods and Chores under Lexicographic Preferences | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Graphical House Allocation | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Approximation Algorithm for Computing Budget-Feasible EF1 Allocations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Yankee Swap: A Fast and Simple Fair Allocation Mechanism for Matroid Rank Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Fairness in the Assignment Problem with Uncertain Priorities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Possible Fairness for Allocating Indivisible Resources | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Hedonic Games With Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals: Resolving Open Questions and Fine-Grained Complexity | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Learning Properties in Simulation-Based Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Epistemic Abstract Argumentation Framework: Formal Foundations, Computation and Complexity not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Online Coalitional Skill Formation not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Best of Both Worlds: Agents with Entitlements | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Mitigating Skewed Bidding for Conference Paper Assignment | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Price of Anarchy in a Double-Sided Critical Distribution System | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Improved EFX Approximation Guarantees under Ordinal-based Assumptions | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Altruism, Collectivism and Egalitarianism: On a Variety of Prosocial Behaviors in Binary Networked Public Goods Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Best of Both Worlds Fairness under Entitlements | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Adapting Stable Matchings to Forced and Forbidden Pairs | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| A Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| A Redistribution Framework for Diffusion Auctions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Social Choice Around Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: On the Computational Social Choice of Digital Communities | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Rule-Tool-User Nexus in Digital Collective Decisions | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| A Hotelling-Downs Game for Strategic Candidacy with Binary Issues | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Mechanism Design for Improving Accessibility to Public Facilities | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Settling the Distortion of Distributed Facility Location | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Cost Sharing under Private Valuation and Connection Control | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Facility Location Games with Thresholds | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Random Majority Opinion Diffusion: Stabilization Time, Absorbing States, and Influential Nodes | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Node Conversion Optimization in Multi-hop Influence Networks | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Being an Influencer is Hard: The Complexity of Influence Maximization in Temporal Graphs with a Fixed Source not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| The Grapevine Web: Analysing the Spread of False Information in Social Networks with Corrupted Sources not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Collective Robustness of Heterogeneous Decision-Makers Against Stubborn Individuals not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Extended Ranking Mechanisms for the m -Capacitated Facility Location Problem in Bayesian Mechanism Design | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Stability of Weighted Majority Voting under Estimated Weights | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Impact of Tie-Breaking on the Manipulability of Elections | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Trust in Shapley: A Cooperative Quest for Global Trust in P2P Network not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Parameterized Guarantees for Almost Envy-Free Allocations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Combining Voting and Abstract Argumentation to Understand Online Discussions | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| An Online Learning Theory of Brokerage not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Robust Popular Matchings | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| On the Complexity of Pareto-Optimal and Envy-Free Lotteries | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Learning a Social Network by Influencing Opinions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Fairness and Efficiency Trade-off in Two-sided Matching | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| A Simple 1.5-approximation Algorithm for a Wide Range of Maximum Size Stable Matching Problems | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| The Parameterized Complexity of Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Gerrymandering Planar Graphs | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Computational Aspects of Distortion | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Facility Location Games with Fractional Preferences and Limited Resources | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| From Market Saturation to Social Reinforcement: Understanding the Impact of Non-Linearity in Information Diffusion Models not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximating the Core via Iterative Coalition Sampling | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Capacity Modification in the Stable Matching Problem | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Nash Stability in Hedonic Skill Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via Matchings | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Tight Approximations for Graphical House Allocation | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Keeping the Harmony Between Neighbors: Local Fairness in Graph Fair Division | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Discovering Consistent Subelections | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| To Lead or to be Led: A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem under Dependence | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Catfished! Impacts of Strategic Misrepresentation in Online Dating not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Veto Core Consistent Preference Aggregation | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fine-Grained Liquid Democracy for Cumulative Ballots | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Approximating APS Under Submodular and XOS Valuations with Binary Marginals | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Location | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Learning Partner Selection Rules that Sustain Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with the Option of Opting Out not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Coalition Formation with Bounded Coalition Size | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Bounding the Incentive Ratio of the Probabilistic Serial Rule | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| A Complete Landscape for the Price of Envy-Freeness | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| A Task-Driven Multi-UAV Coalition Formation Mechanism | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Evaluating District-based Election Surveys with Synthetic Dirichlet Likelihood | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Single-Winner Voting with Alliances: Avoiding the Spoiler Effect | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Robust Knowledge Extraction from Large Language Models using Social Choice Theory not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Online Decentralised Mechanisms for Dynamic Ridesharing not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Multi-user Norm Consensus | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Value Alignment in Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Battlefield Transfers in Coalitional Blotto Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Algorithmic Filtering, Out-Group Stereotype, and Polarization on Social Media not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Chores Fairly: Revisited | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Reducing Optimism Bias in Incomplete Cooperative Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Positive Intra-Group Externalities in Facility Location | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Viral Marketing in Social Networks with Competing Products | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Majority-based Preference Diffusion on Social Networks | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Maximising the Influence of Temporary Participants in Opinion Formation | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Fair and Efficient Division of a Discrete Cake with Switching Utility Loss | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Budget-feasible Egalitarian Allocation of Conflicting Jobs | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Adaptive Incentive Engineering in Citizen-Centric AI not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Selecting Representative Bodies: An Axiomatic View | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Who Reviews The Reviewers? A Multi-Level Jury Problem | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| EFX Allocations and Orientations on Bipartite Multi-graphs: A Complete Picture | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Harmonious Balanced Partitioning of a Network of Agents | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Impact Measures for Gradual Argumentation Semantics | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximation Ratio for Preference Aggregation Using Tree CP-Nets | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Algorithmically Fair Maximization of Multiple Submodular Objective Functions | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Truthful and Welfare-maximizing Resource Scheduling with Application to Electric Vehicles | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Market Under Uncertainty | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Allocation of Divisible Goods under Non-Linear Valuations | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Condorcet Winners and Anscombe's Paradox Under Weighted Binary Voting | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| On the Gale-Shapley Algorithm for Stable Matchings with a Partial Honesty Nash Refinement | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Price of Anarchy in Spatial Social Choice | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Opinion Dynamics with Median Aggregation | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Towards Envy-Freeness Relaxations for General Nonmonotone Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Maximizing Value in Challenge the Champ Tournaments | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Computing Efficient Envy-Free Partial Allocations of Indivisible Goods | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Welfare Approximation in Additively Separable Hedonic Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Towards Fair and Efficient Public Transportation: A Bus Stop Model | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Game-Theoretically Secure Distributed Protocols for Fair Allocation in Coalitional Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Fair Division in a Variable Setting | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Computing Efficient and Envy-Free Allocations under Dichotomous Preferences using SAT | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Selecting Interlacing Committees | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Why Instant-Runoff Voting Is So Resilient to Coalitional Manipulation: Phase Transitions in the Perturbed Culture | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Boosting Sortition via Proportional Representation | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Learning Real-Life Approval Elections | Voting · Rationalization | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Eliminating Majority Illusion | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| On the Hardness of Fair Allocation under Ternary Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Non-obvious Manipulability in Hedonic Games with Friends Appreciation Preferences | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fairly Allocating Goods in Parallel | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Voter Model Meets Rumour Spreading: A Study of Consensus Protocols on Graphs with Agnostic Nodes not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Approximating One-Sided and Two-Sided Nash Social Welfare With Capacities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Fairness and Optimality in Routing not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Full Proportional Justified Representation | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| k - ApprovalVeto: A Spectrum of Voting Rules Balancing Metric Distortion and Minority Protection | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Bakers and Millers Game with Restricted Locations | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Dynamic Coalition Structure Detection in Natural-Language-based Interactions | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Soft Condorcet Optimization for Ranking of General Agents | Voting · Rationalization | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Curiosity-Driven Partner Selection Accelerates Convention Emergence in Language Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Rational Capability in Concurrent Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Resource Task Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Indifferential Privacy: A New Paradigm and Its Applications to Optimal Matching in Dark Pool Auctions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Candidate Nomination for Condorcet-consistent Voting Rules | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| The Strong Core of Housing Markets with Partial Order Preferences | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| Housing Market on Networks | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Degree of (Extended) Justified Representation and Its Optimization | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| Maximizing Truth Learning in a Social Network is NP-hard not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | ||
| FLIGHT: Facility Location Integrating Generalized, Holistic Theory of Welfare | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Asymptotic Existence of Class Envy-free Matchings | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | ||
| On the Structure of EFX Orientations on Graphs | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentives for Early Arrival in Cost Sharing | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Tyranny of the Minority in Social Choice: a Call to Arms | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Tackling the Protocol Problem in Automated Negotiation not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Swap Bribery | Elkind, Faliszewski, Slinko | Voting · Bribery & Control | control | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Prices Matter for the Parameterized Complexity of Shift Bribery | Bredereck, Chen, Faliszewski, Nichterlein, Niedermeier | Voting · Bribery & Control | control | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction | Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Laurent Bulteau, Edith Elkind, Nimrod Talmon, Nicholas Teh | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| How Should We Vote? A Comparison of Voting Systems within Social Networks | Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Ben Armstrong, Kate Larson, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Allocations for Agents with Asymmetric Random Valuations | Yushi Bai, Paul Gölz | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Time-Constrained Participatory Budgeting Under Uncertain Project Costs | Dorothea Baumeister, Linus Boes, Christian Laußmann | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Understanding Distance Measures Among Elections | Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Distortion in Voting with Top-t Preferences | Allan Borodin, Daniel Halpern, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Let’s Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics | Sirin Botan, Simon Rey, Zoi Terzopoulou | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Single-Peaked Opinion Updates | Robert Bredereck, Anne-Marie George, Jonas Israel, Leon Kellerhals | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| When Votes Change and Committees Should (Not) | Robert Bredereck, Till Fluschnik, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Preserving Consistency in Multi-Issue Liquid Democracy | Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Voting in Two-Crossing Elections | Andrei Constantinescu, Roger Wattenhofer | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Approval with Runoff | Théo Delemazure, Jérôme Lang, Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver | Frontier · Knockout Tournaments | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| The Complexity of Envy-Free Graph Cutting | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian, Thekla Hamm, Sebastian Ordyniak | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Online Approval Committee Elections | Virginie Do, Matthieu Hervouin, Jérôme Lang, Piotr Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| On the Ordinal Invariance of Power Indices on Coalitional Games | Jean-Paul Doignon, Stefano Moretti, Meltem Ozturk | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Efficient Resource Allocation with Secretive Agents | Soroush Ebadian, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Insight into Voting Problem Complexity Using Randomized Classes | Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Approximate Strategyproof Mechanisms for the Additively Separable Group Activity Selection Problem | Michele Flammini, Giovanna Varricchio | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Two for One & One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets | Hadi Hosseini, Fatima Umar, Rohit Vaish | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Phragmén Rules for Degressive and Regressive Proportionality | Michał Jaworski, Piotr Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location | Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris, Rongsen Zhang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion | Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem: Approval-Based Matching with Applicant-Employer Relations | Marina Knittel, Samuel Dooley, John Dickerson | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Explaining Preferences by Multiple Patterns in Voters’ Behavior | Sonja Kraiczy, Edith Elkind | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Biased Majority Opinion Dynamics: Exploiting Graph k-domination | Hicham Lesfari, Frédéric Giroire, Stéphane Pérennes | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportional Budget Allocations: Towards a Systematization | Maaike Los, Zoé Christoff, Davide Grossi | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment | Justin Payan, Yair Zick | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Multiwinner Elections under Minimax Chamberlin-Courant Rule in Euclidean Space | Chinmay Sonar, Subhash Suri, Jie Xue | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Near-Tight Algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant and Thiele Voting Rules | Krzysztof Sornat, Virginia Vassilevska Williams, Yinzhan Xu | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Maxmin Participatory Budgeting | Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Yadati Narahari | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| How to Sample Approval Elections? | Stanisław Szufa, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Martin Lackner, Arkadii Slinko, Krzysztof Sornat, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location with Capacity Limits | Toby Walsh | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Manipulating Elections by Changing Voter Perceptions | Junlin Wu, Andrew Estornell, Lecheng Kong, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| On the Complexity of Calculating Approval-Based Winners in Candidates-Embedded Metrics | Yongjie Yang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Facility Location Problems | Houyu Zhou, Minming Li, Hau Chan | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximately EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores | Shengwei Zhou, Xiaowei Wu | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Local Differential Privacy Meets Computational Social Choice - Resilience under Voter Deletion | Liangde Tao, Lin Chen, Lei Xu, Weidong Shi | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections | Kunal Relia | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey | Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Intelligence in Strategic Games (Extended Abstract) | Pavel Naumov, Yuan Yuan | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions: A Call to Arms | Dengji Zhao | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Learning Dissemination Strategies for External Sources in Opinion Dynamic Models with Cognitive Biases not comsoc | Abdullah Al Maruf, Luyao Niu, Bhaskar Ramasubramanian, Andrew Clark, Radha Poovendran | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions | Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain, Billy Jin, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| On the Role of Memory in Robust Opinion Dynamics not comsoc | Luca Becchetti, Andrea Clementi, Amos Korman, Francesco Pasquale, Luca Trevisan, Robin Vacus | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| On a Voter Model with Context-Dependent Opinion Adoption not comsoc | Luca Becchetti, Vincenzo Bonifaci, Emilio Cruciani, Francesco Pasquale | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Principal-Agent Boolean Games not comsoc | David Hyland, Julian Gutierrez, Michael Wooldridge | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Why Rumors Spread Fast in Social Networks, and How to Stop It not comsoc | Ahad N. Zehmakan, Charlotte Out, Sajjad Hesamipour Khelejan | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Optimal Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Solution Space Representation | Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Group Fairness in Set Packing Problems | Sharmila Duppala, Juan Luque, John Dickerson, Aravind Srinivasan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Sampling Ex-Post Group-Fair Rankings not comsoc | Sruthi Gorantla, Amit Deshpande, Anand Louis | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Simplification and Improvement of MMS Approximation | Hannaneh Akrami, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Setareh Taki | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores with Surplus | Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents | Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Schelling Games with Continuous Types not comsoc | Davide Bilò, Vittorio Bilò, Michelle Döring, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Jonas Schmidt | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Delegated Online Search not comsoc | Pirmin Braun, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Conrad Schecker | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Proportionality Guarantees in Elections with Interdependent Issues | Markus Brill, Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Jannik Peters | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors | Ioannis Caragiannis, Nikolaj Schwartzbach | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items | Ioannis Caragiannis, Jugal Garg, Nidhi Rathi, Eklavya Sharma, Giovanna Varricchio | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Optimal Seat Arrangement: What Are the Hard and Easy Cases? | Esra Ceylan, Jiehua Chen, Sanjukta Roy | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap | Shayan Chashm Jahan, Masoud Seddighin, Seyed-Mohammad Seyed-Javadi, Mohammad Sharifi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Exploring Leximin Principle for Fair Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions: Payment Rule Design and Implementation not comsoc | Hao Cheng, Shufeng Kong, Yanchen Deng, Caihua Liu, Xiaohu Wu, Bo An, Chongjun Wang | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Deliberation as Evidence Disclosure: A Tale of Two Protocol Types | Julian Chingoma, Adrian Haret | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Measuring a Priori Voting Power in Liquid Democracy | Rachael Colley, Théo Delemazure, Hugo Gilbert | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Measuring and Controlling Divisiveness in Rank Aggregation | Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, César Hidalgo, Mariana Macedo, Carlos Navarrete | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions | Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John Dickerson | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Algorithmics of Egalitarian versus Equitable Sequences of Committees | Eva Michelle Deltl, Till Fluschnik, Robert Bredereck | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools and Analysis | Piotr Faliszewski, Jarosław Flis, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting Rules on Approval Elections | Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Diversity, Agreement, and Polarization in Elections | Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents not comsoc | Jonathan Gadea Harder, Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores | Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness | Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, Hanpin Wang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| A Unifying Formal Approach to Importance Values in Boolean Functions not comsoc | Hans Harder, Simon Jantsch, Christel Baier, Clemens Dubslaff | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fairly Allocating Goods and (Terrible) Chores | Hadi Hosseini, Aghaheybat Mammadov, Tomasz Wąs | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| On Lower Bounds for Maximin Share Guarantees | Halvard Hummel | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences | Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Ties in Multiwinner Approval Voting | Łukasz Janeczko, Piotr Faliszewski | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Matchings under One-Sided Preferences with Soft Quotas | Santhini K. A., Raghu Raman Ravi, Meghana Nasre | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Convergence in Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty | Joshua Kavner, Reshef Meir, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints | Yasushi Kawase, Hanna Sumita, Yu Yokoi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Truthful Fair Mechanisms for Allocating Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods | Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Xinhang Lu, Biaoshuai Tao | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximating Fair Division on D-Claw-Free Graphs | Zbigniew Lonc | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair Division of a Graph into Compact Bundles | Jayakrishnan Madathil | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Deliberation and Voting in Approval-Based Multi-Winner Elections | Kanav Mehra, Nanda Kishore Sreenivas, Kate Larson | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Learning Efficient Truthful Mechanisms for Trading Networks not comsoc | Takayuki Osogami, Segev Wasserkrug, Elisheva S. Shamash | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Degrees of Projects and Ranged Approval Votes | Gogulapati Sreedurga | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Error in the Euclidean Preference Model | Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Chores with Symmetric and Asymmetric Agents | Tianze Wei, Bo Li, Minming Li | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Ordinal Hedonic Seat Arrangement under Restricted Preference Domains: Swap Stability and Popularity | Anaëlle Wilczynski | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Truthful Auctions for Automated Bidding in Online Advertising not comsoc | Yidan Xing, Zhilin Zhang, Zhenzhe Zheng, Chuan Yu, Jian Xu, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximate Envy-Freeness in Graphical Cake Cutting | Sheung Man Yuen, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials | Yuxin Zhao, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| TDG4Crowd:Test Data Generation for Evaluation of Aggregation Algorithms in Crowdsourcing | Yili Fang, Chaojie Shen, Huamao Gu, Tao Han, Xinyi Ding | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Complex Contagion Influence Maximization: A Reinforcement Learning Approach | Haipeng Chen, Bryan Wilder, Wei Qiu, Bo An, Eric Rice, Milind Tambe | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Online Certification of Preference-Based Fairness for Personalized Recommender Systems (Extended Abstract) | Virginie Do, Sam Corbett-Davies, Jamal Atif, Nicolas Usunier | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty (Extended Abstract)∗ | Yao Zhang, Xiuzhen Zhang, Dengji Zhao | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Complexity Results and Exact Algorithms for Fair Division of Indivisible Items: A Survey | Trung Thanh Nguyen, Jörg Rothe | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract) | Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Learning to Design Fair and Private Voting Rules (Extended Abstract) | Farhad Mohsin, Ao Liu, Pin-Yu Chen, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Pushing the Limits of Fairness in Algorithmic Decision-Making | Nisarg Shah | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding | Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Endogenous Energy Reactive Modules Games: Modelling Side Payments among Resource-Bounded Agents | Julian Gutierrez, David Hyland, Muhammad Najib, Giuseppe Perelli, Michael Wooldridge | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Parameterized Complexity of Kidney Exchange Revisited | Úrsula Hébert-Johnson, Daniel Lokshtanov, Chinmay Sonar, Vaishali Surianarayanan | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Individual Fairness under Group Fairness Constraints in Bipartite Matching - One Framework to Approximate Them All | Atasi Panda, Anand Louis, Prajakta Nimbhorkar | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Fostering Collective Action in Complex Societies Using Community-Based Agents | Jonathan Skaggs, Michael Richards, Melissa Morris, Michael A. Goodrich, Jacob W. Crandall | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Faster Optimal Coalition Structure Generation via Offline Coalition Selection and Graph-Based Search | Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Optimizing Viscous Democracy | Ben Armstrong, Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Facility Location Problems with Capacity Constraints: Two Facilities and Beyond | Gennaro Auricchio, Zihe Wang, Jie Zhang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Welfare Loss in Connected Resource Allocation | Xiaohui Bei, Alexander Lam, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Computing Optimal Equilibria in Repeated Games with Restarts | Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Evaluation of Project Performance in Participatory Budgeting | Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Šimon Schierreich, Piotr Skowron, Stanisław Szufa | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees | Ioannis Caragiannis, Georgios Kalantzis | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Parameterized Analysis of Bribery in Challenge the Champ Tournaments | Juhi Chaudhary, Hendrik Molter, Meirav Zehavi | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| On the Pursuit of EFX for Chores: Non-existence and Approximations | Vasilis Christoforidis, Christodoulos Santorinaios | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Online Learning of Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games | Saar Cohen, Noa Agmon | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Couples Can Be Tractable: New Algorithms and Hardness Results for the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Couples | Gergely Csáji, David Manlove, Iain McBride, James Trimble | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Popular and Dominant Matchings with Uncertain and Multimodal Preferences | Gergely Csáji | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Aggregation of Continuous Preferences in One Dimension | Alberto Del Pia, Dušan Knop, Alexandra Lassota, Krzysztof Sornat, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Comparing Ways of Obtaining Candidate Orderings from Approval Ballots | Théo Delemazure, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters, Magdalena Tydrichova | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Selecting the Most Conflicting Pair of Candidates | Théo Delemazure, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Stanisław Szufa | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Truthful Interval Covering | Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Individual Rationality in Topological Distance Games Is Surprisingly Hard | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Dušan Knop, Šimon Schierreich | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Metric Distortion with Elicited Pairwise Comparisons | Soroush Ebadian, Daniel Halpern, Evi Micha | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores | Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division | Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Determining Winners in Elections with Absent Votes | Qishen Han, Amelie Marian, Lirong Xia | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Fair Distribution of Delivery Orders | Hadi Hosseini, Shivika Narang, Tomasz Wąs | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Sampling Winners in Ranked Choice Voting | Matthew Iceland, Anson Kahng, Joseph Saber | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| The Distortion of Threshold Approval Matching | Mohamad Latifian, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Polynomial Time Presolve Algorithms for Rotation-Based Models Solving the Robust Stable Matching Problem | Sulian Le Bozec-Chiffoleau, Charles Prud'homme, Gilles Simonin | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Allocating Mixed Goods with Customized Fairness and Indivisibility Ratio | Bo Li, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Zekai Wu | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets not comsoc | Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang | unclassified | IJCAI 2024 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Ordinal Maximin Guarantees for Group Fair Division | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Toward Completing the Picture of Control in Schulze and Ranked Pairs Elections | Cynthia Maushagen, David Niclaus, Paul Nüsken, Jörg Rothe, Tessa Seeger | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Computational Complexity of Verifying the Group No-show Paradox | Farhad Mohsin, Qishen Han, Sikai Ruan, Pin-Yu Chen, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘* | triple proof |
| Nonparametric Detection of Gerrymandering in Multiparty Plurality Elections | Dariusz Stolicki, Wojciech Słomczyński, Stanisław Szufa | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Enabling Sustainable Freight Forwarding Network via Collaborative Games | Pang-Jin Tan, Shih-Fen Cheng, Richard Chen | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Mechanisms That Play a Game, Not Toss a Coin | Toby Walsh | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Improved Approximation of Weighted MMS Fairness for Indivisible Chores | Fangxiao Wang, Bo Li, Pinyan Lu | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| A Complete Landscape of EFX Allocations on Graphs: Goods, Chores and Mixed Manna | Yu Zhou, Tianze Wei, Minming Li, Bo Li | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Learning Conditional Preference Networks: An Approach Based on the Minimum Description Length Principle | Pierre-François Gimenez, Jérôme Mengin | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| From Skepticism to Acceptance: Simulating the Attitude Dynamics Toward Fake News not comsoc | Yuhan Liu, Xiuying Chen, Xiaoqing Zhang, Xing Gao, Ji Zhang, Rui Yan | unclassified | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choice | Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Simon Rey, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Strategic Aspects of Stable Matching Markets: A Survey | Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey not comsoc | Xiang Liu, Hau Chan, Minming Li, Weiwei Wu | unclassified | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| A Survey on Rank Aggregation | Siyi Wang, Qi Deng, Shiwei Feng, Hong Zhang, Chao Liang | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Voting by Axioms (Extended Abstract) | Marie Christin Schmidtlein, Ulle Endriss | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Algorithmic Fairness in Distribution of Resources and Tasks | Hadi Hosseini | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Expanding the Reach of Social Choice Theory | Warut Suksompong | Frontier · Knockout Tournaments | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| EF1 and EFX Orientations | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith, Viktoriia Korchemna | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Argument-based Multi-Issue Negotiation not comsoc | Thalya Fossey, Jean-Guy Mailly, Pavlos Moraitis | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies | David X. Lin, Daniel Hall, Giannis Fikioris, Siddhartha Banerjee, Éva Tardos | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location | Toby Walsh | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Improved Rank Aggregation Under Fairness Constraint | Diptarka Chakraborty, Himika Das, Sanjana Dey, Alvin Hong Yao Yan | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Distance Preservation Games | Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Patrick Lederer, Shivika Narang, Toby Walsh | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| How to Resolve Envy by Adding Goods | Matthias Bentert, Robert Bredereck, Eva Deltl, Pallavi Jain, Leon Kellerhals | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Constrained Serial Dictatorships Can Be Fair | Sylvain Bouveret, Hugo Gilbert, Jérôme Lang, Guillaume Méroué | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Settling the Complexity of Popularity in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games | Martin Bullinger, Matan Gilboa | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Multi-Organizational Scheduling: Individual Rationality, Optimality, and Complexity not comsoc | Jiehua Chen, Martin Durand, Christian Hatschka | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Maximin Share Guarantees for Few Agents with Subadditive Valuations | George Christodoulou, Vasilis Christoforidis, Symeon Mastrakoulis, Alkmini Sgouritsa | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Decentralized Online Learning by Selfish Agents in Coalition Formation | Saar Cohen, Noa Agmon | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Inverse Game Theory: An Incenter-Based Approach not comsoc | Lvye Cui, Haoran Yu, Pierre Pinson, Dario Paccagnan | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores | Edith Elkind, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Participatory Budgeting Project Strength via Candidate Control | Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Dušan Knop, Jan Pokorný, Šimon Schierreich, Mateusz Słuszniak, Krzysztof Sornat | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| EFX Feasible Scheduling for Time-dependent Resources | Jiazhu Fang, Qizhi Fang, Minming Li, Wenjing Liu | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Non-Obvious Manipulability in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games | Diodato Ferraioli, Giovanna Varricchio | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Emma Rewinski, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| More Efforts Towards Fixed-Parameter Approximability of Multiwinner Rules | Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Souvik Saha, Saket Saurabh, Anannya Upasana | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots | Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Warut Suksompong | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Dividing Conflicting Items Fairly | Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Hirotaka Yoneda | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees | Pallavi Jain, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Online Housing Market | Julien Lesca | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximately EFX and fPO Allocations for Bivalued Chores | Zehan Lin, Xiaowei Wu, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Stackelberg vs. Nash in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game not comsoc | Yan Liu, Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Jie Zhang | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Viral Marketing and Convergence Properties in Generalised Voter Model not comsoc | Abhiram Manohara, Ahad N. Zehmakan | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong, Tomohiko Yokoyama | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Variety-Seeking Jump Games on Graphs not comsoc | Lata Narayanan, Jaroslav Opatrny, Shanmukha Tummala, Alexandros A. Voudouris | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| The Core of Approval-Based Committee Elections with Few Seats | Dominik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Optimal Capacity Modification for Stable Matchings with Ties | Keshav Ranjan, Meghana Nasre, Prajakta Nimbhorkar | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Improved Approximation Ratio for Strategyproof Facility Location on a Cycle | Krzysztof Rogowski, Marcin Dziubiński | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality | Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Markus Utke | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Finding Possible Winners in Spatial Voting with Incomplete Information | Hadas Shachnai, Rotem Shavitt, Andreas Wiese | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Improved MMS Approximations for Few Agent Types | Parnian Shahkar, Jugal Garg | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Probabilistic Analysis of Stable Matching in Large Markets with Siblings | Zhaohong Sun, Tomohiko Yokoyama, Makoto Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents | Xiaowei Wu, Quan Xue, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Revisiting Proportional Allocation with Subsidy: Simplification and Improvements | Xiaowei Wu, Quan Xue, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| First-Order Coalition Logic not comsoc | Davide Catta, Rustam Galimullin, Aniello Murano | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| On Middle Grounds for Preference Statements | Anne-Marie George, Ana Ozaki | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making | Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Minimizing Polarization and Disagreement in the Friedkin–Johnsen Model with Unknown Innate Opinions | Federico Cinus, Atsushi Miyauchi, Yuko Kuroki, Francesco Bonchi | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple | |
| Recommender Systems for Democracy: Toward Adversarial Robustness in Voting Advice Applications | Frédéric Berdoz, Dustin Brunner, Yann Vonlanthen, Roger Wattenhofer | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Control in Computational Social Choice | Jiehua Chen, Joanna Kaczmarek, Paul Nüsken, Jörg Rothe, Ildikó Schlotter, Tessa Seeger | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| A Survey on Bandit Learning in Matching Markets not comsoc | Shuai Li, Zilong Wang, Fang Kong | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Shapley Value Computation in Ontology-Mediated Query Answering (Extended Abstract) not comsoc | Meghyn Bienvenu, Diego Figueira, Pierre Lafourcade | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple | |
| Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games (Extended Abstract) | Yaoxin Ge, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| MatchXplain: Analyzing Preferences, Explaining Outcomes, and Simplifying Decisions | Hadi Hosseini, Yubo Jing, Ronak Singh | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Best of Both Worlds Fairness under Entitlements -- probablistic allocation of indivisible items -- already probabilistic | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Probabilistic Rationing with Categorized Priorities: Processing Reserves Fairly and Efficiently | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Semi-Popular Matchings and Copeland Winners | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Host Community Respecting Refugee Housing | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Online Matching with Delays and Stochastic Arrival Times | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Stable Marriage in Euclidean Space | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Experimental paper on stable roommates | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Revisiting the Distortion of Distributed Voting | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Bounded Approval Ballots: Balancing Expressiveness and Simplicity for Multiwinner Elections | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2023 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| On the Distortion of Single Winner Elections with Aligned Candidates | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| SAT-based Judgment Aggregation | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Collecting, Classifying, Analyzing, and Using Real-World Ranking Data | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Margin of Victory for Weighted Tournament Solutions | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Separating and Collapsing Electoral Control Types | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Distortion of Approval Voting with Runoff | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| On the Complexity of the Two-Stage Majority Rule | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fairness in Participatory Budgeting via Equality of Resources | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| k-Prize Weighted Voting Game | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Computing the Best Policy that Survives a Vote | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Voting by Axioms | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘* | triple proof | |
| Voting with Limited Energy: A Study of Plurality and Borda | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple |
Δ is the settled direction of the complexity change, discrete → continuous: ↘ drops (the prize), → preserved, ↗ rises, ↘* encoding-dependent. Blank = mirror not yet settled by the prover round.
608 cells · 127 carry a classical status (81 NP-c / 77 P / 22 NP-h / 4 Θ₂ᵖ, over 196 variant entries from ~30 source-checked papers) · 9 explicitly open · continuous mirror: 1 machine-proved & adversarially reviewed + 35 entries proved in the ChoCo paper (17 drops ↘) + 16 open targets incl. INV-PERM-MAX · 133 cells n/a · 57% of the town uncharted
| attack \ rule | Plu | dAp | Bor | Sco | App | SPA | Fal | Buc | Cop | C1 | Mxm | Kem | Sla | Cnd | Dod | You | Bal | Nan | IRV | veto | PluRO | Coo | rp | SNTV | kBor | CCr | AVm | SAV | GAV | RAV | PAV | referenda |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winner determination | → | → | Θ→ | Θ→ | → | Θ↘ | Θ↘ | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Swap Bribery | P | ±↘→ | N↘→ | P→ | – | N | N? | N | N | ?→ | → | P↘ | ? | ? | N | P | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||||||
| Shift Bribery | P→ | ±↘ | ↘ | – | ? | P | P→ | N | ± | → | → | ↘ | ? | ? | N | N | N | N | N | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||
| $Bribery | ± | ↘ | N↘ | ±↘ | ± | ± | ±? | N | N | P→ | → | ±↘ | P? | P? | ± | |||||||||||||||||
| Microbribery | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | P | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||||||
| Support Bribery | ± | ± | ± | ? | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||
| Mixed Bribery | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Extension Bribery | ? | N | P | – | P | N | ± | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||||||
| Manipulation | P | ± | N | P | P | ± | ± | N | N | N | ± | N | N | |||||||||||||||||||
| CCAV (priced) | P | ± | N | N | ± | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| CCDV (priced) | P | ↘ | ↘ | ± | ↘ | N | N | → | → | ±↘ | ? | ? | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Possible Winner | P | N | N | N | – | N | N | N | N | P | N | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||||||||||
| Combinatorial Shift Bribery | N | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Committee Shift Bribery | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | P | N | N | ± | N | ± | ± | N | – |
| Margin of Victory / destructive | P | P | P | N | N | N | P | N | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Multimode / candidate control | ± | ± | N | ± | P | ! | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Frugal Bribery | ± | ± | N | N | N | N | N | N | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Persuasion | P | ± | N | ± | P | – | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Lobbying (referenda) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | ± |
Primary color = the CLASSICAL discrete status (P vs NP-hard), assembled from ~30 source-checked papers; every colored cell clicks through to its variant-by-variant statuses with citations — the same cell is routinely P and NP-hard under different cost models, which is why the legend needs ±. Arrows are the continuous mirror: a cell can carry several at once (k-Approval × Swap drops for additively separable costs and stays hard for general costs). Most of the town is still uncharted — and this is one paper's vocabulary plus one literature sweep, before multiwinner or weighted voters.
The top trust tier of this atlas is formal (Lean) verification, and the experiment was to formalize the bribery paper behind the town. The finding is that “formalize the paper” is the wrong unit of work: what actually has to be built is the theory the paper — and half of computational social choice — stands on. Exact rational LP duality and the ellipsoid method (a large chunk of Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver), a real machine model in which “polynomial time” is a theorem about Turing machines rather than a slogan, and the parameterized-complexity basics (what an FPT reduction is, hardness of Clique) that the Handbook's hardness results silently assume. None of this existed in mathlib. The chart below is that theory, partially built — and it is a reusable foundation for every future pin, not a per-paper cost.
External results enter as explicitly stated assumptions (Lean interfaces — never axioms),
so a paper can be verified modulo named citations: “†” below marks these. That packaging is what makes
paper-scale verification feasible at all, and it is also the sharpest danger: mis-formalize an assumption and
everything above it silently rests on a falsehood. This is not hypothetical — the machine audit of this very
development flagged the GLS vertex-encoding interface as likely false as stated (a \(10E^2\) bit
bound where Cramer-rule arithmetic forces roughly \(E^3\)), and found a legacy layer in which
P = NP was a structure field, so theorems “concluding” it concluded nothing.
Both were caught by auditing the assumption surface — the discipline this page exists to display.
596 Lean files · 111,968 lines · 0 axiom / 0 sorry / 0 native_decide · 42% of the mathematical development is assumption-free end to end · 19 external interfaces tracked · 1,118 automated #print axioms checks · snapshot 2026-08-12
Metrics regenerate from the repository via tools/lean_audit.py (tripwire greps, import-cone
analysis, watchlist diffs) as the formalization progresses; the module structure and assumption audit are from the
machine inventory of the development. 223 regression files pin proved statements to
their intended shape, and an axiom-audit file re-checks every central declaration on each build.
Most of computational social choice studies finite societies: a list of voters, an integer program, an NP-hardness proof. Nearly every such result has an unexamined continuous mirror: replace the population by a distribution of voter types with masses, keep the computational question. Sometimes the mirror is easier — the integer program relaxes to a linear program and NP-hardness drops to P. Nobody has charted where. This atlas is the chart, and it is being drawn by an automated pipeline.
Each paper of the pilot corpus is read by an adversarial triple (proponent, opponent, judge — GPT-5.6 class models). A pin is green if the judge finds a named result whose continuous mirror survives the opponent's best case against it; red otherwise. For green papers, a packaging stage turns the mirror into a self-contained proof task (target chosen by fixed rules from what the discrete result asserts), a prover attempts it, and a second, independent model is prompted to BREAK the proof — an adversarial review, not a rubber stamp. A gold ring marks a new result: the prover settled the mirror and the adversarial review failed to break the proof. No human has audited these — that is the next tier, and saying so plainly is the point of the tier system.
Every element here is the output of a fixed chain of tools, each stage writing machine-readable records that the next stage — and this site — is built from:
atlas_build.py renders this site from those records and nothing else. No pin,
verdict, quote or proof on this site is hand-typed.machine-claimed (prover only) < adversarially reviewed (an independent model tries to break the proof and fails) < human-checked < formalized (Lean — see The Foundations). Every gold element on this site links to its full provenance — the exact task, the proof, the adversarial review. Nothing here is hand-typed except the map background and the curated grid data, which was itself extracted from the literature by an agent and struck by a human.
This is a growing chart, not a finished one. It currently covers 527 papers across 12 venue-years (AAAI 2022, AAAI 2023, AAAI 2024, AAAI 2025, AAMAS 2022, AAMAS 2023, AAMAS 2024, AAMAS 2025, IJCAI 2022, IJCAI 2023, IJCAI 2024, IJCAI 2025). The proofs are adversarially reviewed by machines, not checked by humans — and “verified” is a word this atlas reserves for the Lean tier. The town grid is one paper's vocabulary. The point of the atlas is not that it is finished — it is that every element you can click was produced, end to end, by a pipeline that can now be pointed at the next conference, the next cell, and the next area.
Openness about the pipeline is part of the point, and it arrives in two steps. Already now, every published build of this site is stamped — see the footer — with the exact commit of the pipeline repository that produced it, and every gold element links its full provenance: the task as posed, the proof as returned, the adversarial review as it happened. The pipeline itself (code, prompts, harness) is still changing weekly and will be released in full once it settles; because the build stamps are public first, that release can be checked retroactively against every build that ever appeared here. One thing is never published: paper full texts — provenance pages quote only the specific named statements under discussion.